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New epidemics of infectious diseases often involve health care workers. In this short communication we present a case report of 
a health care professional who became the fi rst case of infl uenza H1N1 virus to be notifi ed in the United Arab Emirates. There are 
several issues related to workplace considerations and general public health, including preventive measures, the need for isolation 
of the patient, dealing with contacts, return to work, and communication with the workforce.
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Introduction
In recent years influenza viruses have circulated in seasonal 
(H3N2, H1N1) and avian (including H5N1) forms. There has 
been concern that Influenza A (H5N1), a worldwide cause of 
large poultry outbreaks, which by December 2009 had affected 
467 persons (282 deaths), would drift or shift to become the 
next pandemic strain [1]. However in April 2009 ‘Swine flu’ 
caused by a new strain of influenza A, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
emerged. 
This has now become the dominant strain producing an 
illness that is transmitted in the same way as seasonal influen-
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za, which in most cases is mild, which can be effectively treated 
with antiviral drugs and for which a vaccine is now available. 
By the end of 2009 many countries were still reporting disease 
activity and an impact on health-care services [2]. 
In the early days of  the H1N1 pandemic, when there 
was uncertainty about the infectivity and virulence of the new 
virus, a more precautionary approach to management was 
advocated. This included laboratory testing of suspected cases, 
contact tracing, isolation of cases and contacts, anti-viral medi-
cation for treatment and prophylaxis, and clinical surveillance 
and follow-up.     
In this short case report we describe the personal experi-
ence and management of the first case of H1N1 reported in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Case Report
Perspective from the patient
The patient was a 48 year-old male academic public health 
physician who had just returned to the Middle East after 
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spending a week with his family in Saskatoon in Canada. His 
journey to the UAE was via Calgary and Heathrow airport in 
London, UK. He started feeling lethargic, and developed a sore 
throat, with cough and high fever for around 10 hours since the 
night of his arrival in Dubai, UAE. This led him to consult the 
on-duty infectious disease consultant at the Emergency Depart-
ment of a local hospital at around 8:00 am the following day.
The consultation included a discussion of  any possible 
exposure to H1N1 since Canada was recognized then as expe-
riencing a large number of cases of the infection. A combined 
influenza A&B antigen screen on a nasopharyngeal swab was 
positive, and an additional swab and a blood sample were then 
sent for further confirmatory testing. He was prescribed Oselta-
mivir 75 mg orally twice daily for five days, azithromycin 500 
mg daily and paracetamol 500 mg three times daily for three 
days, and advised to remain at home until the confirmatory test 
results were available. 
By the next morning, the patient’s fever and sore throat 
had subsided and he was feeling better. Despite the very low, 
but nevertheless real risk of having ‘swine flu’, the patient had 
to make some important difficult decisions regarding his state 
of health and his work deadlines. His work place was a univer-
sity campus and as he had no lectures that day, he had no need 
to be in contact with any students. All scheduled appointments 
on his calendar for the day were cancelled, but he decided to 
proceed with a ten- minute scheduled presentation to six of his 
peers regarding a large research grant proposal. A mask was 
not worn during the presentation, and he returned home im-
mediately after the event. The patient was alone at home but 
one of  his relatives came to visit him unannounced, accom-
panied by his wife and a ten year old child from a neighboring 
town. They stayed at his home for that night, as the distance for 
return travel was considerable.
On the next day the patient received a call from the Health 
Authority confirming Influenza A (H1N1) infection and he 
was therefore in the unenviable although historical position of 
being the first reported case of  H1N1 infection in the UAE. 
The patient was admitted to hospital with airborne and contact 
isolation, where he completed the rest of the maximum recom-
mended 10 days quarantine period. The visiting couple and 
child also had to stay at the patient’s home for 10 days of quar-
antine and all also received prophylactic medicine (Oseltamivir). 
No lab tests were advised. 
As a public health physician, the index case had con-
sidered the H1N1 situation before commencing his travels to 
Canada. At that time (May 8 2009), the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) did not recommend restricting travel, although 
some individual national authorities were advising against non-
essential travel. The advice on the various websites seemed very 
pragmatic: observe basic hygiene, hand-washing and cough 
etiquette; do not travel when ill and seek medical advice if  you 
become ill after your return. The patient’s route to Canada took 
him through London (34 cases reported in the UK at that time) 
and Toronto (15 cases in Ontario) to Saskatoon (2 cases). By 
the time he was due to return to the UAE from Saskatoon via 
Calgary, the number of  cases in Canada had increased from 
242 to 496 with 19 in Saskatchewan and 67 in Alberta. During 
his stay in Saskatoon he did not recall meeting anyone with re-
spiratory symptoms and he was quite well on his journey back 
to Dubai. He was therefore not certain where and from whom 
he caught the infection.
Public health and occupational health perspective
This case raised several issues related to workplace and general 
public health. Measures taken by the UAE government to pre-
vent an influenza epidemic include the installation of thermal 
scanners at Dubai, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi airports (three 
major international airports in the United Arab Emirates). The 
individual was afebrile and symptom-free on arrival at the air-
port, and so was not detained for further enquiry. The thermal 
scanners will detect individuals with fever from whatever cause, 
but will not necessarily detect those with early H1N1 infection, 
especially if  they are afebrile [3].
Effective and timely communication is essential to allay 
unwarranted concerns from the public and at the workplace. 
Queries from the media were channeled to a senior member of 
the administration from the office of the Dean - to ensure con-
sistency in the information provided. He was briefed by public 
health physicians, occupational health physicians and hospital 
clinicians dealing directly with the case. A central news release 
was provided to staff  and students on H1N1 reiterating the 
importance of hygiene in regards to limitation of transmission. 
The workplace was a university campus. This case did not have 
any lectures or meetings with students. Contact with a few co-
workers was transient (not more than 15 minutes in the same 
area). These contacts were counselled on the low likelihood 
of acquiring the infection. They were informed about seeking 
medical advice if  they had any other reasons for concern or if  
they developed H1N1 symptoms. Doctors, nurses and ancil-
lary healthcare workers looking after the case while in hospital 
were briefed on hygiene and infection control procedures. N-95 
masks, gloves and gowns were provided to health-care staff.
The Health department took prompt action. Family mem-
bers with close contact were quarantined at home. They were 
given a prophylactic course of Oseltamivir. Adequate supplies 
of food and provisions and maintenance of phone communi-
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cation was confirmed. The public health department dealt with 
general queries from the public. Official release of information 
and contact with the WHO was through the federal Ministry 
of Health. The airline that transported the case from Canada to 
the UAE sought to contact passengers in the rows adjacent to 
the passenger’s allocated seat.  None of those who were traced 
developed any flu-like illness within the incubation period fol-
lowing the timing of the flight.  
Discussion
Where new epidemics of  infectious diseases appear, history 
has shown that the cases have often included healthcare work-
ers, and their family members [4]. The index case for Ebola 
infection was a hospital laboratory worker, and secondary 
cases occurred in other healthcare workers and within the 
family. Two-thirds of  the deaths from the early outbreaks of 
Ebola infection occurred in healthcare staff. The early cases of 
SARS and H5N1 infection included doctors and nurses [5-7]. 
The likelihood of healthcare staff being affected in such infec-
tions is high, especially in the absence of adequate preventive 
measures, or if  there is poor compliance with recommended 
precautions. In this particular first reported case of H1N1 infec-
tion in the UAE, prompt and appropriate action resulted in the 
individual being treated, the risk of transmission being reduced, 
and the provision of  information being timely and adequate. 
None of the known contacts developed signs and symptoms of 
the disease. It was not possible to contact the taxi driver who 
shared the same vehicle with the case during the hour long 
journey from the airport home, but there were no reports of 
infection in any Dubai taxi driver in the 2 weeks following the 
journey.
We now believe that even if  they are infectious, clinicians 
who practice good respiratory and hand hygiene will limit the 
risk of transmission to others. Standard and droplet precautions 
should be in place [8]. Standard Precautions minimize exposure 
to potentially infected blood and body fluids and include hand 
hygiene and the use of appropriate personal protective equip-
ment. Droplet precautions require that a medical mask is worn 
when working within one meter of the patient and that when 
performing aerosol-generating procedures, further measures are 
taken including the use of eye protection, N-95 masks or other 
equivalent or more effective respirators and other personal pro-
tective equipment. In addition, respiratory or cough etiquette 
should be observed so that all persons cover their mouth and 
nose with a disposable tissue when coughing or sneezing, and 
then disposing the used tissue promptly. Within the healthcare 
setting, administrative, environmental and engineering controls 
such as frequent cleaning of work areas should also be in place.
Generally it will not be appropriate to conduct contact 
tracing of  patients or to provide anti-viral prophylaxis. How-
ever if  there has been a particular type of  contact between a 
healthcare worker and a patient (for example intubation) or a 
patient is at high risk of severe or complicated infection, then 
further risk assessment is indicated with a view to offering 
prophylaxis. An alternative approach, if  practical, is to moni-
tor exposed persons and administer antiviral treatment when 
symptoms develop. When a vaccine becomes available the first 
priority should be to immunize healthcare staff.
When pandemic influenza is widespread in a community 
it will inevitably have consequences for the workplace not least 
because that is a setting where transmission can occur. In these 
circumstances occupational health practitioners should be 
prepared to lead a consistent and proportionate response. Staff 
with influenza will be diagnosed on the basis of  symptoms. 
The clinical diagnostic criteria are fever (≥ 38oC) or a history of 
fever and two or more symptoms of an influenza-like illness i.e. 
cough, sore throat, headache etc. Those who satisfy this case 
definition should be sent home and advised not to work until 
fully recovered. A risk assessment should be carried out and 
the risk of transmission to other staff members should be con-
sidered in terms of the excess risk compared to acquiring the 
infection from other community sources.
Stories about the new H1N1 case in town appeared daily 
and reflected public anxiety. The media can play an important 
role in allaying the fears of  the community by providing ad-
equate and accurate information. The installation of thermal 
scanners at points of  entry has their limitations, and is not 
recommended by the WHO. Studies indicate many of its draw-
backs, including a low positive predictive value of 3.5% [2].  
An unpublished population study carried out in the UAE 
during October 2009 by medical students investigated the im-
pact of the recent H1N1 pandemic on the parents of primary 
school children. They found that while the majority of parents 
had good knowledge of H1N1 and its mode of transmission, 
many had mistaken beliefs about the origin of the virus, for ex-
ample thinking that it had been genetically engineered. Parents 
reported changing their behaviour because of  H1N1, taking 
measures such as cancelling travel plans and restricting social-
izing. Also, while most had confidence in the way in which 
the authorities had managed the pandemic, they continued to 
worry that their families were at risk of infection and were not 
persuaded of the safety of available vaccines. 
In conclusions, as for many epidemics, dealing with ini-
tial cases is often a key to successful subsequent management 
of  further outbreaks. This case documents the experience of 
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a public health physician as a patient in an infectious disease 
epidemic, with lessons for occupational and public health man-
agement. The lack of further transmission from this first case 
in the UAE may be a combination of good and effective public 
health intervention, or serendipity. Even though H1N1 has 
high infectivity with low case fatality rates, the number of cases 
globally declined, and WHO declared the end of the pandemic 
on 10th August 2010.
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